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Synopsis 
Policing has recently attracted a great deal of controversy set against the 
recent wave of student disturbances and the use of paramilitary tactics to 
disperse, contain and kettle protestors. Moreover, the controversial 
application of stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 has 
raised further questions about the accountability of the police.  
 
The responsibility of holding the police to account currently falls to the 43 
police authorities operating across England and Wales. This paper draws on 
ground-breaking research on police authorities using questionnaire and in-
depth interview data to outline just how it is that police authority members 
approach their duties and responsibilities. It outlines the role and potential of 
police authorities to influence police policy and operations and discusses how 
the work of police authorities has impacted on participation by local citizens. 
Our starting position is that citizen participation is a prerequisite for the 
effective delivery of accountable policing. This has serious consequences for 
the proposed Police and Crime Commissioners, which are intended to 
replace police authorities in the near future. 
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Introduction 
Police authorities are independent bodies. They have the responsibility to set 
the strategic direction for the local police force whilst simultaneously holding 
the chief constable to account for the policing service delivered.  There is a 
police authority for each local police force - 43 in England and Wales.  
 
The Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 – which came into force on 1st 
April 1995 – brought significant changes to both the composition and powers 
of police authorities in England and Wales. The act made police authorities 
independent of local government, reduced the numbers of elected councillors 
and introduced independent members for the first time. As a result of the act, 
police authority membership consisted of 9 local councillors, 5 independent or 
appointed members and 3 magistrate members totalling 17 members. Some 
larger authorities have slightly more members; for example the Metropolitan 
Police Authority has 23 members which enabled it to more adequately 
represent London’s size and make up and the Greater Manchester Police 
Authority has 19 members. The Police and Justice Act (2007) changed the 
appointment process and the basis of police authority membership. As a 
result of the act, magistrate members cease to exist as a separate category 
although most police authorities continue to appoint magistrate members 
under the provision of the act which requires ‘other persons, including at least 
one lay justice’ (The Police and Justice Act (2007): Schedule 2, Section 4). 
 
The role of police authorities was further re-defined under The Police Act 
1996 which gave them specific additional responsibilities, including the 
requirement to publish local policing plans in consultation with local 
communities and other interest groups. The act also included the 
responsibility of monitoring performance, collecting and publishing 
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performance information, producing efficiency and Best Value performance 
plans, delivering best value, accounting for the constabulary's finances, 
managing the constabulary’s resources, planning and deciding budgets, 
investigating complaints against senior police officers and monitoring overall 
complaints procedures through to appointing chief police officers.  
 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) created Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRP) under which police forces and local authorities, in co-
operation with police authorities and other agencies, were required to consult 
the public on a local audit of crime and disorder and a strategy for tackling 
them.  The onus for crime prevention became a joint responsibility between 
the police and local authorities. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provided 
the remit for partnerships to be inclusive of agencies and individuals in their 
area. There was however a fear that police authorities had a somewhat lesser 
role because a), local authorities had greater resources than police 
authorities, hence the expectation that local authorities would have a greater 
degree of influence over local policing priorities; and b), under The Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998) police authorities were not afforded the same status as 
local authorities or the police service. The passing of the Police Reform Act 
(2002) rectified this and police authorities were given the same status as 
police forces and local authorities on Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRP): in addition, police authorities were required to produce 
annual policing plans to consider the views of the local community. According 
to Jones and Newburn (1997) whilst the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 
1994 had already given police authorities sufficient powers, they argued that 
if police authorities worked in a seamless way with the chief of police there 
would be very little room for police authorities to be undermined or side-lined 
at the local level. 
 
This situation could potentially arise because police authorities do not appear 
to impact (directly) on operational policing in the same way as the activities of 
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the Crime Reduction Partnerships. At the end of their study of six police 
authorities, Jones and Newburn (1997) concluded that although chief police 
officers still dominated policy and the planning process, the Police and 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994 gave police authorities’ potential strength that 
was yet to be applied in full.  They concluded that if police authorities worked 
in a seamless way with the chief constable then there would be very little 
room for the authority to be undermined or side-lined at local level.  
 
As the bridge between local people and police forces, police authorities have 
a crucial role to play in building trust, gaining confidence and ensuring that 
the collective will is reflected in local policing. It is increasingly clear that they 
stand in a pivotal position and can - if they so desire - really influence the 
experience of policing - an experience in which the role of the citizen is crucial 
(Audit Commission, 2002, 2003a; Dalgleish, 2003:3; MORI, 2003; Coleman, 
2005).  
 
Our system of police accountability will only attract and retain public 
legitimacy if those who have this stewardship role to ensure increased 
accountability – police authorities and their members – fully understand and 
appreciate their roles, responsibilities and the mechanisms through which an 
account can be brought. What we have with police authorities and the 
tripartite system1 is an arrangement that is set up to facilitate transparency 
and a higher degree of accountability.  However, in reality there appears to be 
insufficient access and knowledge of the process or the methods by which 
the citizen can influence policing and by which policing can be understood. 
According to some academics this confusion is intentional (Jones et al, 1994: 
27). 
 
                                                 
1 The tripartite system refers to the three-way governance arrangement of policing between 
the Home Secretary, Chief Constables and Police Authorities. 
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Representation, Trust and Accountability 
 
In general, there are low levels of public participation in the provision of 
services. The Audit Commission (2003a; 2003b) conducted research on 
accountability, public trust and confidence in public services and found that 
people trusted individuals much more than organisations because the notion 
of trust was based on relationship, familiarity and experience. The Audit 
Commission (2003a) rated the police as the worst of three services in 
providing information although the police was the institution that was seen as 
most likely to be controlled by an independent watchdog. The Audit 
Commission (2003a) found that, generally, public trust in local authorities was 
low and the reason that it was much lower in the police was primarily because 
the public did not think that the police would listen to their views and also that 
public awareness of the regulators was low. Preoccupation with the tripartite 
structure of accountability implicitly denies the place and importance of the 
citizen. It is important for the effective functioning of the police that we 
acknowledge that the tripartite system would be improved if it were a quartet 
of Home Secretary, chief constables, police authorities and citizens.  
Scarman (1986, 4.60) noted ‘… [the police] enforce the law on behalf of the 
community; indeed they cannot effectively enforce it without the support of 
the community’. The proposal by the coalition government to elect 
commissioners to replace police authorities is an attempt to address this 
issue (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011). 
 
Public awareness of police authorities is almost non-existent (Dalgleish, 
2003; Myhill, 2003; Docking, 2003); in fact the recent announcements by the 
coalition government about police authorities and local accountability has 
done more for the profile of police authorities than almost anything in recent 
years. Public knowledge of the existence of police authorities is crucial if they 
are to be effective and have the credibility required to undertake their role: 
this will also be true for the newly elected commissioners for whom a higher 
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level of accountability, public engagement and results will be required (Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011).  
 
Calls for greater public accountability dictate that an institution has:  
a) Sufficient expertise,  
b) Adequate knowledge of its role and the mechanisms of leverage,  
c) That there are checks and balances to negate undue influence and 
d) That the institution has the resource capability to deliver 
(Pyper,1996:3). 
 
For police authorities, many of the above requirements have been met.  For 
example, police authorities arguably have the basic structural framework, 
resources and relevant powers to enable them to perform their functions. 
They have responsibility for setting the police budget; they have the additional 
resources and expertise of their members. There is also the appointment of 
civil staff (or secretariat) whose role it is to support the appointed members in 
their work for the authority. Both police authority members and the civil staff 
work closely with the local police force to produce local policing plans and the 
chief constable  reports on a monthly basis to the authority on the activities of 
the force.  
 
However, there have been increasing calls to strengthen police authorities 
because of the shift of power away from police authorities to the Home Office 
and chief constables (Jones and Newburn, 1994)). The effect of this is that 
there are few checks and balances in the system not only because police 
authorities and its members have insufficient knowledge about what it is that 
they and the authority ought to be doing, but also because they lack the 
formal powers they need to exert real influence. Our research supports the 
findings of Jones and Newburn (1997) who found that police authorities were 
increasingly preoccupied with organisational issues rather than the strategic policy 
issues governing local policing.  On this basis, it is clear that police authorities have 
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little real control and are unable to effectively bring chief constables and their police 
services to account in any meaningful way. 
 
 
Methodology 
At the time of our research there are approximately 760 police authority 
members in the 43 police authorities in England and Wales. In late 2007 
questionnaire surveys were sent to all police authorities and initially 81 were 
returned. In January 2008 a further 200 questionnaires were sent out and a 
further 27 completed questionnaires were received, totalling 108 (14.2%). 
Some police authorities have generic email addresses where all 
correspondence is filtered to the police authority member by Member 
Services. However, where direct contact details were available the 
questionnaire was sent directly to individual police authority members. Some 
police authorities such as Hertfordshire Police Authority have a designated 
member to respond on behalf of the police authority.  While the total number 
of respondents that returned completed questionnaires was 108, the total 
number of responses for each question varies considerably as some 
respondents provided multiple answers to some questions. 
 
New empirical ground has been covered by this research, as the literature 
reveals no similar survey which has focused on police authority members. In 
addition, 24 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with specific 
individuals who are significant gatekeepers between the community, the 
police service and the police authority. Interviewees included 17 police 
authority members, a former Home Secretary, the Chairman of the 
Association of Police Authorities, the Executive Director of the Association of 
Police Authorities, the Policy Officer of the Association of Police Authorities, 
the Clerk to the Metropolitan Police Authority, a former chief constable and a 
grade 5 civil servant.  
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Between 1964 and 1994 there has been a small body of work on police 
authorities (Jones & Newburn, 1997; Brogden, 1977; Reiner, 1991). This 
paper sets out the most recent academic work on police authorities and is the 
only empirical academic work to look at the role of police authorities in the 
context of citizenship and accountability. 
 
The findings of the research shed light on the following: 
a) The relevancy of police authorities, their potential and their 
actual impact. 
b) The role of police authorities in relation to the citizen, the 
police service and accountability. 
c) The views of police authority members on how they perceive 
their role and the role of the police authority. 
 
 
Findings 
This research has shown that 68 out of the 126 (54%) responses by police 
authority members to the question of responsibility accepted that the police 
authority was ultimately responsible for policing in their area and as far as 
responsibility was concerned they ranked the police service and the Home 
Office in second (29) and third (21) place respectively (Fig.1). 
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Figure.1 Who is ultimately responsible for policing? 
 
 
The question of ‘who is ultimately responsible for policing’ was – in effect – a 
statement of duty rather than legal responsibility. Whilst members accepted 
that responsibility for policing ultimately lay with them as police authority 
members, further analysis of the responses reveals a clear disconnection 
between the perceived balance of responsibility (Fig.1), the right to make final 
decisions in disputes (Fig.2) and the perceived possession of power (Fig.3). 
Responses to Figure.3 show that whilst members felt the police authority had 
the least power within the tripartite system, they perceived that it had the 
most responsibility. This viewpoint was further reinforced when members 
responded to the question: ‘who they thought had the final decision in 
disputes?’’ (Fig.2). The overwhelming view was that the Home Secretary 
clearly had the final decision. In-depth interviews with police authority 
members shed further interesting light on this issue.  One independent 
member of North Wales Police Authority forcibly emphasised during the 
interview that wherever the power and final decision lay, it was most definitely 
not with the police authority.  He explained:  
21 
(17%) 
29 
(23%) 68 
(54%) 
3 
(2%) 
5 
(4%) Home Office
Police Service
Police Authority
Tripartite
Other
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‘... I sometimes ask in a meeting - and publicly - if we vote against this 
[action, policy or direction] what will happen? and the answer is that it 
will go ahead anyway!’ 
 
Figure.2  In disputes who has the final decision? 
 
 
Fig.2 shows that the vast majority of the sample believe that the Home 
Secretary has the final decision in disputes. Fig.3 also provides contemporary 
support to the position expounded by Reiner (1991) that the Home Secretary 
and chief constable hold the balance of power. According to Reiner (2000) 
and Brogden (1977) in cases of real conflict between a chief constable and a 
police authority not only would the chief constable always prevail but the 
police authority would defer to the expertise of the chief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
(7.5%) 
1 
(0.9%) 
93 
(87.7%) 
4 
(3.8%) 
Police Authority
Chief Constable
Home Secretary
Depends
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Figure.3  Where does the balance of power reside? 
 
 
The former Home Secretary Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP saw the balance of 
power as primarily residing with the chief constable and saw that the onus 
was on the police authority to find a way to work with the chief of police whom 
he saw as controlling operational policing. An independent member of North 
Wales Police Authority felt that the relationship was ‘...more about influence 
rather than power’ which suggested that far from the ‘self-limiting’ description 
of Jones et al (1994: 62), the police authority was able to exercise its 
influence through a more complex process of negotiation rather than through 
the overt display of power. 
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(13%) 
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(5%) 
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(10%) 
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Police
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Equally
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Figure.4  Within the tripartite system is the police authority proactive or 
reactive? 
 
 
On the question of whether members thought their police authority was 
proactive or reactive, Fig.4 shows that over 81 of the 157 responses indicated 
their belief that the police authority was more reactive than proactive. Despite 
this, an independent member of the Metropolitan Police Authority argued that 
in order to effectively fulfil its role police authorities had to be proactive. A 
councillor member of Sussex Police Authority explained that as a police 
authority Sussex tried to be proactive but ‘...at the end of the day we are lay 
people and are not involved 24 hours a day, seven days a week.’ Other 
interviewees also echoed this and saw their police authorities as more 
reactive than proactive.  Typical of this view was the following: ‘...there is a 
degree of inevitability because just in terms of energy and resources there is 
a squad of people [police and civil staff] paid and working fulltime... this is 
where the power lies.’  
 
 
 
 
 
71 
(45.2%) 
81 
(51.6%) 
5 
(3.2%) 
Proactive
Reactive
Unsure
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Figure.5 Who do members represent? 
 
 
Eighty four members (Fig.5) saw themselves as primarily representing the 
residents in their local areas while 39 saw that they had a responsibility to 
represent the police authority. In order for police authorities to be effective 
there needs to be a balance between the responsibilities of members to 
represent and consult with local people - which is a responsibility given to 
police authorities under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984), the 
Police and Magistrates Courts Act (1994) and the Crime and Disorder Act 
(1998) - and the responsibility of the police authority under the provision of 
the Police Act (1964) (section 4.1) ‘to secure the maintenance of an adequate 
and efficient police force for the area’. The job description for police authority 
members clearly reflects this aspiration stating that members are appointed to 
fulfil a dual role; ‘… to represent the views of the police authority within local 
communities and the views of local communities to the authority’ 
(Leicestershire Police Authority, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
11 
(7.5%) 
39 
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6 
(4.1%) 
84 
(57.5%) 
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Figure.6 Are members doing enough to represent those identified in 
Figure.5? 
 
 
Figure.7  Is the police authority doing enough to represent its 
constituents? 
 
 
On the question of whether police authorities were doing enough to represent 
residents, the police service and the wider community, 73 responses (Fig.7) 
indicated that members thought their police authority was doing enough. 
Even though 61 responses (Fig.6) indicated that members felt that they and 
other members like themselves were doing enough to represent those they 
had identified in Fig.5, 39 members (Fig.6) indicated that as members they 
51.7% 
(61) 
33.1% 
(39) 
15.3% 
(18) 
Yes
No
Unsure
64.6% 
(73) 
25.7% 
(29) 
9.7% 
(11) 
Yes
No
Unsure
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were not doing enough whilst 18 were unsure about whether they were doing 
enough to represent effectively. 
 
At the heart of the question of whether police authority members are doing 
enough to represent the interests of those who depend on them is the 
question of whether members know how to bring the chief constable to 
account and more specifically what questions to ask. This research supports 
the findings of Day & Klein (1987) that police authority members lack 
sufficient knowledge and understanding, resulting in them being unable to ask 
the right questions; it supports Jones and Newburn’s (1994) findings about 
the confusing relationship between members of the tripartite system; it 
supports the findings of Stephens (1988) that police authority budgetary 
powers were not effective as a means of influence and, finally, our research 
supports Hewitt (1996) who saw police authorities as performing house-
keeping functions and Reiner (1992) who saw police authorities as largely 
ineffective. One Metropolitan Police Authority member explained that in her 
experience, 
 
‘... in order to know what questions to ask you read a lot! The 
commissioner is at our behest and we know what to ask by doing our 
own research in the same way journalists do. If we attend meetings 
and expect things to be handed to us we are not doing our job.’ 
 
A councillor member of Sussex Police Authority and a councillor member of 
North Yorkshire Police Authority both argued that local knowledge and 
experience were vital if members were to be effective and to know what to 
ask. 
 
An independent member of North Wales Police Authority explained that 
members are appointed not as experts but because they have been ‘round 
the block’ and the variety of experience that comes to the authority 
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particularly from those with public sector experience is considerable. This 
response implies that members are pragmatic and aware that their scope of 
effectively holding the police to account is potentially restricted by the 
resource and time implications that go along with the terms of their 
appointment. 
 
Figure.8 How effective are Community Police Consultative Groups 
(CPCG)? 
 
 
Figure.9  Do they attract a representative audience? 
 
14 
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17 
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Not at all 
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Given the importance of consultation, 47 members saw Community Police 
Consultative Groups (CPCG) as very or fairly effective and 58 thought 
CPCGs were hardly or not at all effective (Fig.8). The overwhelming view 
amongst those police authority members who responded to this particular 
question was that where police authorities had not adopted new forms and 
methods to consult with local people but continued with the old consultative 
arrangements, 77 (76%) out of 101 responses indicated that the forums did 
not attract a sufficiently representative audience (Fig.9).  
 
Figure.10 Can accountability be strengthened by electing police authority 
chairs and members? 
 
 
According to Michael Howard (2005), and Loveday and Reid (2003) 
accountability could be enhanced and supported by the direct election of 
officials including police authority members and chief constables. The results 
from this survey have shown that whilst 52 police authority members believed 
that accountability would be strengthened by electing police authority chairs 
47.3% 
(52) 
40.9% 
(45) 
11.8% 
(13) 
Yes
No
Unsure
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and members (Fig.10), there was no evidence to support the assertion that 
the process of elections would make the work of the police authority more 
accountable or indeed more effective. A councillor member of Cumbria Police 
Authority explained that ‘electing members would be stupid and electing chief 
constables would be equally stupid!’  An independent member of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority also supported this position and explained that 
elections would not make the police authority more efficient and that she was 
certain that the elected route would simply maintain the status quo by electing 
white male professionals. 
 
Figure.11 Would electing members be more democratic than 
appointments? 
 
 
Even though 57 respondents thought that electing police authority members 
would be more democratic than a recruitment process (Fig.11), the reality is 
that the merits of appointing through a recruitment process cannot be 
assessed against that of an electoral one because both processes are 
attempting to select people using different criteria. The overwhelming majority 
of interviewees accepted that whilst an elected system would be more 
55.3% 
(57) 24.3% 
(25) 
20.4% 
(21) 
Yes
No
Unsure
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democratic, selecting members through such a process was far less 
desirable. One Metropolitan Police Authority member asked:  
 
‘Why would you elect a commissioner of police when you do not elect 
the head of the fire service or the head of any other similar service?’  
 
There is a valid question which is that if all members were elected, the lack of 
independent non-politically partisan members on police authorities would not 
be good for local communities. 
 
Figure.12 Would elected chief constables improve accountability and give 
the local community a greater say? 
 
 
On the prospect of electing chief constables, 92 members (Fig.12) did not 
believe that elections would improve accountability or increase the voice of 
the local community and there was consensus that trained professional police 
were best placed to fill these roles as opposed to professional politicians. 
Thirty respondents believed that directly electing chief constables would 
result in a reduction in accountability because this accountability would be to 
the electorate and not accountability in terms of stewardship (Pyper, 1996), 
rectification (Mulgan, 2003: 30) or ‘the ability to impose a cost’ (Keohane, 
2002: 479). Forty seven respondents believed elected chief constables would 
6.6% 
(7) 
86.8% 
(92) 
6.6% 
(7) 
Yes
No
Unsure
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have no impact whatsoever and only 13 respondents thought that there would 
be an increase in accountability. 
 
Figure.13 Do you think the citizen knows about police authorities? 
 
 
Even though 84 police authority members saw their primary role as 
representing local people (Fig.5), 86 members felt that the citizen did not 
know about the police authority (Fig.13) and 13 members were unsure 
whether or not the citizen knew about them.  
 
Figure.14 Do you think citizens are aware of the distinction between the 
police service and the police authority? 
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On the question of whether the public were aware of the distinction between 
the police authority and the police service, the overwhelming view was that 86 
out of 107 responses indicated that the distinction was known.  
 
Figure.15 Do national policing plans contradict local priorities? 
 
 
On the question of whether national policing plans were at odds with local 
priorities, 53 members believed that the plans did impact negatively or 
contradict local priorities versus 49 who did not (Fig.15). One police authority 
member explained that in the larger city areas there was no conflict between 
local and national plans because local plans were heavily dictated by the 
national agenda - which in itself the member argued served to demonstrate 
the dominance of the Home Office. The member went on to explain that in the 
provincial towns there was a real possibility of conflict; for example, if the 
national concern is with level 2 criminality (cross border issues affecting more 
than one basic command unit) but the local area is concerned with level 1 
criminality (local crimes within a basic command unit). An independent 
member of Staffordshire Police Authority agreed that this sort of conflict did 
indeed occur but added that there was some inevitability to this, as some 
58.9% 
(53) 54.4% 
(49) 
6.7% 
(6) 
Yes
No
Unsure
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issues such as terrorism must be a national priority even though at times its 
implementation could conflict with local concerns. In general, our findings 
support the work of Reiner (1991) who found that most chief constables made 
efforts to develop good working relationships with their police authorities in 
order to ensure that policing policy was largely in tune with local needs. 
 
Finally, given the complex and sometimes onerous duties placed on police 
authority members, the level and quality of training they receive should be 
mentioned. Whilst 96 members had received regular training and 13 did not, 
38 members thought that the training they had received was insufficient for 
the tasks they were expected to undertake; four members were unsure of its 
usefulness, whilst 25 respondents thought the training was sufficient. Only 29 
reported that the training had been good. 
 
Conclusion 
Our starting position is that citizen participation is a prerequisite for the 
effective delivery of accountable policing because the police do not stand 
outside of the citizenry but they are at one and the same time the citizen. This 
has serious consequences for the proposed Police and Crime 
Commissioners, which are intended to replace police authorities in the near 
future because they will be specifically charged with representing the wishes 
of the citizen. However, many police authority members believe that police 
authorities are not doing enough. A significant number of members 
questioned their own usefulness and what it was that they and the police 
authority were doing as far as representation was concerned. 
 
Police authorities need to overhaul their consultative arrangements. Since 
2003 police authorities have begun to move away from reliance on traditional 
police community style meetings to forms of neighbourhood policing. Raine et 
al. (2006) explained that good accountability depended on good 
communication processes and they cited that neighbourhood policing was an 
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exciting development which if adequately resourced could deliver much in 
terms of public reassurance.  
 
In 2005, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) established twelve 
‘Accountability Pilots’ led by police authorities and found that some offered 
valuable opportunities for participation enabling police authority members to 
hear first-hand how neighbourhood policing was working. It is clear from this 
research that failure to provide these opportunities will see police authorities 
become increasingly irrelevant to people’s everyday experience of policing.  
 
It is imperative that people know that they can exert influence on policing. 
One of the key challenges for police authorities is that many people are not 
aware of their existence. This problem is augmented by the fact that police 
authority members see themselves as having minimal power to influence 
policing. Participation through consultation is only meaningful if people’s 
views can be seen to make a difference; it must do more than simply getting 
people to talk, ‘people must decide and do things’ (McHugh and Parvin, 2005: 
22). 
 
A further challenge arises in ensuring that police consultations are not seen 
as just the mouthpiece of the police service, simply informing the community 
of police actions and policy. Police authorities need to develop local links and 
local knowledge in order to build up trust with the public. 
 
The public in turn needs to demand more from their police authority members 
– who are in fact their ambassadors. This research has uncovered that police 
authority members charged with this important responsibility have a low level 
of trust in their own abilities and the rigour with which they are representing 
the interests of the wider community. Police authorities can only be effective if 
members are confident in their own abilities; that they know the questions to 
ask and have the tools to bring the chief constables to account.  
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A Grade 5 civil servant interviewed argued that far too many police authority 
clerks tended to be fearful of their chief constables, showing an alarming level 
of deference to them. Where challenges did take place they occurred within 
very narrow and ‘almost’ agreed boundaries. This could lead one to conclude 
that policing by consent actually leaves the public voice outside. It was clear 
from the research that police authority members lacked sufficient knowledge 
to be able to ask the right questions. While many also lack the awareness of 
their legal powers, this research has shown that what police authority 
members really need is an inquisitive mind and the ability to investigate. 
 
There are also increasing demands on members’ time restricting their ability 
to serve the authority whilst undertaking other work. This can also serve as a 
disincentive to those who are able to offer much needed expertise on police 
authorities. In particular there is a deficit of members with professional 
business and financial expertise to broaden the knowledge base of the police 
authority.  
 
The shift of power away from police authorities in favour of the Home Office 
and chief constables does not automatically mean that police authorities are 
unable to discharge their responsibilities. However, police authorities are 
constrained by chief constables appealing directly to the Home Secretary and 
refusing to elaborate or amend reports. This leverage can directly undermine 
the scrutiny function of the police authority. Chief constables should be 
responsive to the wishes of their employers – the police authority – and 
should be limited in their ability to circumvent this responsibility. 
 
Whilst police authorities have a statutory responsibility to consult with the 
public in order to determine annual local policing priorities, there is no similar 
responsibility placed on the police service to consult with police authorities. 
Bob Jones (Chair of the APA) explained that the onus was on police 
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authorities to ask questions rather than the police service to tell. A statutory 
responsibility reversing this and placing the onus on the police service would 
begin to address this imbalance. 
 
The passage of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill is now 
completed and it received Royal Assent on 15th September 2011.  The Act 
abolishes police authorities and replaces them with directly elected Police 
and Crime Commissioners, who have the responsibility of improving police 
accountability. Except for the Metropolitan Police district - which will have a 
committee of the London Assembly - Police and Crime Commissioners will be 
held accountable by Police and Crime Panels made up of locally elected 
councillors and independent members who will have powers of veto over a 
commissioner’s decisions. Greater transparency of local crime information is 
also planned with the intention of enabling the public to hold the police to 
account.  
 
During the Second Reading of the Bill in 2010, Teresa May MP explained that 
a democratically elected individual was essential in restoring the link between 
the police and the public. This individual would enable the public to have their 
say about what their police and crime commissioner is doing in terms of the 
responsibilities of the police. 
 
Given our evidence of the inability of police authorities to influence, 
adequately represent, or to challenge the police, it would be easy to conclude 
that police authorities should be dissolved and have their powers transferred 
to an elected police and crime commissioner. However, it can be argued that 
transferring police authority powers to an elected individual will see power 
and influence concentrated in too few hands. There is also the additional fear 
that this move will overtly politicise policing (as seen when the Mayor of 
London - Boris Johnson - withdrew his support for Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police Service, resulting in him tendering his resignation) 
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and render the police more susceptible to corruption and corrupting 
influences. 
 
These are indeed real fears. What is clear however is that there is no 
indelible or irrefutable link between corruption and the election of 
commissioners. There is no evidence that policing would become any more 
political than it already is. The election of police commissioners would 
however herald in a different - some argue a better - form of accountability 
because communities would be empowered to directly hold their chief 
constables to account. 
 
Currently the relationship between the police service and police authority is in 
some respects a relationship between collaborators rather than one between 
a service provider and a regulator. Whilst we accept that joint working is 
essential, it is at times unclear where and when these lines are drawn. The 
evidence from our interviews, questionnaires and the literature shows that 
whilst the functions and the responsibilities of police authorities are important, 
the current structure and arrangement has resulted in police authorities being 
unfit for purpose. In fact we found systemic failures in the Metropolitan Police 
Service’s Crime Data Recording. After interviewing a Grade 5 Home Office 
official, we were informed that even though the Metropolitan Police Authority’s 
report (MPA, 2008:15) clearly identified conflicts of interests and evidence of 
systemic failures in the workings of the Metropolitan Police Service, the 
effective real and tangible response from the police authority was grossly 
inadequate.  
 
One of the benefits of the coalition’s proposals for elected commissioners is 
that the current inherent dislocation and disconnect between local people and 
the police would be effectively challenged. No longer would bureaucrats and 
civil servants serve their own purpose by remaining distant from the citizen. 
Instead we would have elected commissioners serving the interests of the 
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‘people’. The question is which people? While proposed legislation may see 
the end of police authorities, the system that replaces them will need to 
address the challenges raised in this research of reconnecting the citizen with 
policing. For example, it remains to be seen whether the proposed Police and 
Crime Panels’ ability to veto the decisions of elected commissioners and 
plans to release more local crime information will help the public directly 
scrutinise elected commissioners. 
 
There are also other challenges, whilst police authorities were important 
bodies with important responsibilities, this research does not present a 
compelling case for maintaining them. Furthermore, there was little evidence 
that they were delivering a critical service without which the police service 
would be disadvantaged or rendered useless. One of the litmus tests of the 
new police and crime commissioners is the degree to which they will make an 
indelible impression on policing and local communities. 
 
The capacity of police and crime commissioners to sustain an effective and 
efficient police service, whilst delivering change and increasing accountability, 
will require detailed attention because the call for greater public accountability 
dictates that the institutions charged with that responsibility are sufficiently 
able to deliver. This is important because our research has shown that size 
matters. For the first time we have identified a distinction based on the size of 
police authorities in the way they scrutinised, brought to account and 
managed policing. We identified how smaller police authorities conducted 
most of their business in full open public meetings and less in committees, 
whilst larger police authorities did the opposite. However, meetings in smaller 
authorities were mainly concerned with the police authority’s internal business 
as opposed to the business of scrutinising and calling the police to account. 
We will be looking with interest at how and if the new arrangements affect 
this.  
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